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IN LOW INCOME COUNTRIES PERFORM POORLY 
By 
Dale W Adams 
Professor of Agricultural Economics 
The Ohio State University 
For several decades after World War II agricultural credit 
activities in low income countries seemed to be straight forward 
and uncomplicated. Most policy makers agreed that a majority of 
the farmers needed cheap loans to boost farm incomes and output, 
and that major aspects of credit programs in high income 
countries could be copied to meet these needs. Based on these 
views, many low income countries established credit cooperatives, 
supervised credit programs, marketing agencies that extended 
loans to farmers, or created ac3ricultural banks in the 1950s and 
1960s.!/ Large amounts of money were channeled through new or 
expanded intermediaries via special rediscount windows in central 
banks, and many regulations were issued to force lenders to make 
more loans to farmers. As a result, loans and grants for agri-
cultural credit projects grew to be a large part of all funds 
directed to rural development by governments and donor agencies. 
In the early 1970s a few people became disturbed about the 
results of these large credit efforts and the overall performance 
of rural financial markets (RFMs). They argued that the outcomes 
of many rural credit projects in low income countries were much 
more complicated and much less desirable than had been anticipated. 
An extensive evaluation of small farmer credit programs by the 
!/ See Bauer, and Belshaw for further details on these views. 
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Agency for International Development in 1972-73, an agricultural 
credit policy paper by the World Bank in 1975, and a credit con-
f erence in Rome sponsored by the Food and .Agriculture Organization 
in 1975 documented this concern. 
Various combinations of at least 10 RFM problems were iden-
tified .l/ These included (1) cumbersome lending procedures that 
cause high loan transaction costs for both lenders and borrowers, 
(2) serious loan repayment problems, and (3) financial inter-
mediaries that implode because their revenues are less than costs. 
It is also common (4) for RFMs to be badly fragmented, (5) for 
intermediaries to evade or ignore the intent of government regu-
lations that adversely affect their economic interests, and (6) 
for strong patronal relationships to exist throughout the system. 
Borrowers depend on lenders, lenders depend on the central bank, 
and the central bank depends on the government or a donor agency 
for funds. (7) Seldom do these markets offer savings deposit 
services, and (8) it is common for intermediaries that do mobi-
lize savings to transfer out of rural areas a significant part of 
the money mobilized. In some countries the volume of money moved 
out is larger than the amount put into rural credit systems by 
donor agencies and governments. Because many segments of RFMs 
are heavily dependent on outside money, (9) substantial political 
intrusions in these markets are common. (10) Worst of all, in 
most cases a very large part of the cheap agricultural credit 
ll See Adams and Graham for further detail and references on 
these problems. 
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ends up in the hands of the well-to-do, instead of the poor.l/ 
These problems have caused malaise among policy makers and 
credit technicians. People have come to expect that rural credit 
programs will be mediocre. While the criticism of this malaise 
and associated problems have mounted, increasing attention has 
turned to clarifying the reasons for these problems and iden-
tifying treatments (e.g. Von Pischke). In the discussion that 
follows, I summarize the main causes for these difficulties and 
go on to briefly outline changes in policies that would cause 
RFMs to perform much better. 
Problem Diagnosis 
Over the past two decades I have looked at financial markets 
in several dozen low income countries, and have been impressed by 
the similarity of their problems. It is clear to me that tradi-
tional agricultural credit activities are doing a poor job of 
supporting development on both equity and efficiency grounds.!/ 
While the specific causes of these problems are time and place 
specific, at least five common reasons are often behind these 
difficulties: (1) agricultural credit efforts are based on 
faulty assumptions, (2) agricultural credit policies and overall 
use of RFMs are incorrect, (3) many bad loans result from various 
public policies that make farming a low economic return business, 
ll See various essays in the volumes published by the 
Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal and the Bangladesh Bank 
for further details on these problems in two Asian countries. 
!/ See various essays in D. w Adams and others, editors, for more 
detail on these points. 
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(4) weak and incorrect research pnd evaluation have helped to 
reinforce faulty policies, and (5) donor agency assistance has 
too often reinforced policies that damage RFMs. 
Faulty Assumption 
It is surprising how many "truths" about rural credit and 
savings have been passed from generation to generation without 
question. These traditional assumptions have a powerful impact 
on agricultural credit policies, and they encompass borrower and 
saver behavior, lender behavior, and the behavior of financial 
markets. 
It is regularly assumed, for example, that most farmers are 
too poor to save, especially in financial form, that most farmers 
need cheap credit before adopting new technology or making pro-
ductive investments, and that most farmers need supervision to 
use credit wisely. All of these assumptions have the same ring 
to them as those challenged by T.W. Schultz in his book 
Transforming Traditional Agriculture in the early 1960s. His 
work along with that of Hopper, Mellor, Yotopoulos and others 
helped dissipate erroneous assumptions about the economic irra-
tionality of rural people. While their arguments are now 
generally accepted, far too many people continue to stereotype 
rural people as irrational when it comes to financial markets. 
Why should a farmer be a careful economizer in product prices, in 
yields, in farm investments, and in input prices and then become 
an idiot when using a loan or holding financial savings? 
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I am convinced, with some research findings to support my 
views, that most rural people in low income countries do not 
regularly need formal loans, that those who do receive formal 
loans usually get few benefits from loan supervision, that most 
rural people will save more if given the opportunity and incen-
tive to do so, and that low interest rates are not necessary to 
induce people to invest in high return activities. A significant 
amount of research has been done the past few years that shows 
that very substantial untapped savings capacities exist in rural 
areas, even among the poor (e.g. Ahn and others, Ong and others, 
and Kato). 
Widespread suspicion surrounds financial intermediaries, 
especially those in informal market, and horror stories are 
quoted and repeated to sustain these biases. Most people who 
work in low income countries hear stories about moneylenders who 
charge an annual interest rate of 360 percent or more on a loan, 
who lend only because they know the borrower will default and the 
lender can take over the borrower's land, or the sons who are 
forced to assume their father's informal debt. Despite an 
increasing number of studies that show these horror stories are 
several standard deviations from the mean behavior of lenders, 
they continue to color agricultural credit policies (Barton, 
Domingo, Singh, Mayar, Harriss). In all too many countries, espe-
cially in the subcontinent, rural credit policy is misdirected at 
driving informal lenders out of business. 
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These suspicions about informal lenders dre based on reli-
gious dogmas, on racial and ethnic biases, and on confusion 
regarding cause and effect. Most Western religions rely on 
scriptures that condemn usury. Numerous societies also restrict 
economic activities of ethnic minorities. Many Jews in Europe, 
the Chinese in Southeast Asia, the Indians in East Africa, and 
Middle Easterners in Latin America were excluded from all but 
marketing activities. These activities often involved financial 
intermediation to facilitate exchange. These ethnic minorities 
are viewed as suspicious outsiders to start with, and ethnic 
biases are reinforced by confusion and suspicison about all 
market intermediaries. The Physiocrats' views that only the 
farmer contributed useful goods in an economy, and Dark .Age 
Christian views that market intermediaries would have a very hard 
time getting into heaven reinforced these biases. 
Further, since any price is higher than a consumer wants to 
pay for a good, and producers always want to have a higher price 
for their products, both groups feel alienated by an impersonal 
marketing system. Both groups feel cheated by most market tran-
sactions, even though they participate in these transactions 
voluntarily. All too often they direct their frustrations at 
poorly understood intermediaries who appear to be leaches on 
society. Seldom does the consumer or the producer understand the 
workings of the market well enough to see how prices are deter-
mined, and the marketing intermediary is often a scapegoat. 
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Further ill feeling about financial intermediaries comes 
from those who are forced to borrow because of economic stress 
due to droughts, floods, or typhoons. It is easy for farmers 
to transfer their grumpiness about their loss to the taking of 
loans. The borrower is likely to see the loan as being part of 
the problem rather than as part of the solution. Later, if the 
borrower should default on the loan and be forced to forego 
collateral, the lender, not the natural disaster that destroyed 
the crop in the first place, becomes the focus of the farmer's 
anger and frustration. 
A final set of damaging assumptions are about finance in 
general and how financial markets operate. In all too many cases 
credit is viewed as an input rather than as being a claim on 
resources and services. The essential properties of financial 
instruments, their fungibility and divisibility, are regularly 
ignored by hard pressed policy makers. This leads them to think 
that these claims can be tightly controlled and directed to spe-
cific uses. If the country wants more rice output, tagged loans 
for rice production ought to do the trick. If more fertilizer 
use is desirable, allocating more loans for fertilizer purchases 
is the right button to push. If the political system feels it is 
necessary to do something for the rural poor, opening a cheap 
credit loan window for small farmers is an easy policy alter-
native. Central credit planning, estimation of credit demand, 
and calls for credit impact studies result from this strategy. 
The financial system is a magnificant political instrument 
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(Robert) • I ts manipulation is ideally suited to the planning 
mentality, even though it gives false illusions of control. In 
many cases governments have tried to assure financial 
intermediaries' compliance with government decrees by nationa-
lizing banks or by creating more government owned banks. It is 
widely thought that a government owned bank can defy the laws of 
financial gravity: its revenues must cover costs if the inter-
mediary does not go down hill financially. The landscape of low 
income countries is littered with rural financial institutions 
that policy makers thought could defy these laws. Formal finan-
cial intermediaries that persist are either seriously undermined 
by policy directives, have to continually rely on government or 
donor assistance, or largely evade the intent of regulations 
through innovation. I see surprisingly little difference between 
the behavior of government owned banks and those that are priva-
tely owned in most low income countries. A main difference is in 
the perception that policy makers have about their ability to 
manipulate these lenders. I also feel that most of these tradi-
tional assumptions about borrowers, savers, lenders, finance, and 
rural financial markets are very weak or false. 
Incorrect Policies 
In many respects it is unfortunate that financial markets 
are so susceptible to manipulation. It is very easy for a donor 
agency or a government to implement a new agricultural credit 
program in response to rural problems. Two aspects of these 
' 
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intrusions into financial markets are troublesome. The first is 
the way these markets have been used in attempts to off set 
distortions in foreign exchange, product price controls, high 
priced inputs, various taxes, and lack of government investment 
in rural areas. Political intrusions into these markets have 
also been aimed at transferring income to the rural poor or at 
allocating political patronage to those who support the regime. 
In some cases cheap loans have also been used to induce rural 
people to join new organizations like agricultural cooperatives. 
In virtually all cases, agricultural credit programs have been 
used to move money quickly into rural areas. These efforts have 
emphasized loans to the almost total exclusion of voluntary 
savings mobilization. 
These credit efforts have been accompanied by several 
damaging policies. Foremost among these has been the low and 
generally inflexible interest rates applied to most agricultural 
loans and to savings deposit services in rural areas. These low 
interest rates are justified as an offset to other price distor-
tions, to transfer income to the rural poor, and to induce far-
mers to use formal loans and new technologies. These low 
interest rate policies are supported by concessionary rediscount 
facilities through the central banks, non-price rationing by the 
financial intermediaries, extensive loan reporting requirements 
that attempt to insure compliance with government credit alloca-
tion plans, and loan supervision. With the serious inflation in 
most low income countries the past 10 years, almost all interest 
' 
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rates char•Jed and paid in rural areas on formal financial instru-
ments have been negative in real terms. As a result, borrowers 
repay lenders less in purchasing power than they borrow. 
These low interest rates have powerful, largely unan-
ticipated, effects on RFMs. The low rates make it difficult for 
financial intermediaries to mobilize significant amounts of 
voluntary private savings. This forces the intermediaries to 
rely on governments and donors to supply loanable funds and to 
become very susceptible to political intrusion. The low rates 
also make it difficult for lenders to cover their operating costs 
with interest revenues. This, in turn, forces the lender to con-
tinually go to governments or donor agencies for subsidies to 
cover operating expenses, or to gradually decapitalize, to shift 
a substantial part of their loan transaction costs to the 
borrower, and/or to reduce their costs of lending by making large 
loans to borrowers with ample collateral. The net result of this 
is that the lender becoines highly dependent on external funding, 
many potential borro~ers are excluded from getting formal loans, 
concessionary priced loans are highly concentrated, and lenders 
have a hard tiine covering their costs. 
Irrespective of the policy makers intent, a weak or bankrupt 
lender provides unsatisfactory financial services. All too often 
the employees of the intermediary are demoralized and discredited 
by this process. Accusations of fraud, mismanagement and incom-
petence typically surround the decline of these financial agen-
cies. Personalities rather than policies are labeled as the 
' 
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cause of the problem. The solution is seen as tightening up the 
administration, appointing new leadership, combining the weak 
organization with another that is better managed, or to create 
still another institution that must live within the same unfa-
vorable environment. Under any political regime lending activi-
ties that cost the lender more than they are allowed to charge 
the borrower are conducive to institutional instability and 
dependence. 
One might be able to accept the undermining of financial 
intermediaries as a worthwhile cost, as long as the equity and 
economic efficiency resource allocation objectives are met. 
But, as suggested earlier, low interest rates force lenders to 
concentrate loans in the hands of relatively few people. Three 
types of benefits accrue to borrowers: First is the normal net 
benefits one gets from profitable use of borrowed resources. 
Second is the implied income transfer associated with negative 
real rates of interest. And, third, is the income transfer bene-
fits that accrue to those who default on loans. All three of 
these benefits are proportional to loan access; large borrowers 
get large benefits, small borrowers get small benefits, and 
non-borrowers ~et no benefit (Gonzalez-Vega, 1977). All savers 
and potential savers in financial form, of course, lose in this 
process. 
Cheap credit also fails to correct for the misallocation of 
resources that results from other price distortions and policy 
shortcomings. Overvalued exchange rates, product price ceilings, 
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import duties on inputs, and lack of public investment in rural 
areas can se~iously depress agricultural incentives, yields, and 
incomes. Governments regularly attempt unsuccessfully, to use 
cheap credit as a second-best policy to offset the effects other 
policies have on the way farmers allocate resources (e.g. David). 
A simple example may help to clarify why low interest rates do 
not induce farmers to allocate resources in a manner not signaled 
by their product prices and yields. Let's assume that a farmer 
in Thailand has a small dairy operation and also grows marijuana. 
Let's further assume that the Thai government sets a very low 
price on milk because of pressures from urban consumers and labor 
unions, and that this causes the farmer in question to want to 
shift resources away from milk production to more profitable 
activities. To discourage this, the government announces a spe-
cial credit program for dairy producers that provides loans at 
negative real rates of interest to compensate farmers for the 
milk price disincentives. 
For the moinent, let's ignore the effect these low interest 
rates have on the behavior of the lender and savers and assume 
that all dairy producers get a cheap loan. The additional 
liquidity provided by tile loan can be used by the borrower to buy 
more consumption goods, to expand production of marijuana, to 
enter into new eonomic activities, or to sustain milk production. 
But, there is no logical reason why the farmer would sustain milk 
production, with or without a cheap loan, since the economic 
returns from that activity are made unattractive by the price 
... 
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control. Household consumption, marijuana production, and new 
economic activities would logically absorb most additional 
liquidity provided by the cheap loan. 
Cheap credit does not make an unprofitable activity profi-
table! Further, the fact that low interest rates force lenders 
to concentrate loans in the hands of relatively few people means 
that the credit subsidy does not flow through the financial 
system in an equitable manner to all those who are forced to pay 
the "tax" imposed by the price control. Using cheap credit to 
offset the misallocation caused by other price and yield distor-
tions is like trying to sweep water up hill. 
Low Economic Returns in Agriculture 
In part, the problems encountered by RFMs in low income 
countries are beyonJ the control of actors in these markets. Low 
product prices, expensive inputs, low and unstable yields, the 
lack of new technology and irrigation, pests, weeds, and natural 
disasters make farmin<J a low return activity in many low income 
countries. At the same time, political instability, wars, cum-
bersome judicial procedures, and vague or uncertain land titles 
increase lending risks. Low returns to agricultural investments 
reduce the repayment capacity of borrowers, force many borrowers 
to seek small loans, and reduce savings capacities. These con-
ditions restrict the scope for efficient financial intermediation 
and make it difficult for intermediaries to realize scale econo-
mies • 
- - -- -- -..., 
. I 
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Most agricultural lenders in the U.S. and other developed 
countries have had it easy since World War II. Large amounts of 
money have been invested in these countries in rural infrastruc-
ture and in agricultural research, and it is also common for high 
income countries to provide price supports or subsidies that give 
strong production incentives to farmers. Grain price supports in 
the European Common Market, milk price supports in the U.S., and 
rice price supports in South Korea and Japan are prominent 
examples of policies that raise the returns and incomes of far-
mers in high income countries. For most of the past 40 years in 
high income countries, agricultural lenders could make a large 
number of loans that had a high likelihood of being repaid, even 
,. if lenders were blind, deaf, and dumb. 
In sharp contrast, most of the low income countries treat 
their agricultural sectors harshly: overvalued exchange rates 
tax ~ricultural exports; import restrictions that protect infant 
industries force farmers to pay inflated prices for their inputs; 
food price controls weaken or destroy farmers' incentives to 
produce; the lack of public investment in rural areas further 
decrease the returns that farmers can expect from their 
investments; yield, price, and political instability also force 
farmers to be very conservative in their production and invest-
ment decisions. Some of the best agricultural loan officers in 
high income countries would have a difficult time putting 
together a strong, small portfolio of agricultural loans in 
countries like Ghana, Peru, Jamaica, Bangladesh, and F.gypt. 
' 
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Clearly, higher agricultural prices and yields would be a major 
step forward in allowing RFMs in low income countries to perform 
better. 
Weak Research and Evaluation 
It should come as no surprise that much of the research done 
on RFMs over the past 30 years has been closely tied to the poli-
cies, strategies, and assumptions already discussed. Until 
recently, relatively little of this research tested policies and 
assumptions (e.g. Grewal). In many low income countries a 
majority of the research has attempted to measure the impact of 
credit use at the farm level, and to also estimate the amounts of 
additional credit needed. Using a medical analogy, very little 
time has been spent in diagnosing the reasons for RFMs problems. 
It is difficult to prescribe proper treatment without diagnosis. 
The modest amounts of research done on savers' behavior, the 
behavior of financial intermediaries, and work on the overall 
performance of RFMs reflects the effects of strongly held tradi-
tional assumptions. 
Far too much research has ignored fungibility. Most micro 
research has not considered all of the sources and uses of 
liquidity for farm households. Too many researchers have tried 
to draw conclusions about cause and effect in farm households 
after studying only one source of liquidity, a formal loan, and 
only one use of liquidity like the purchase of fertilizer. 
• 
t 
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Seldom is this type of research able to establish that the fer-
tilizer would not have been purchased without the loan--the addi-
tionality issue. 
Still other studies try to measure the impact of loans by 
comparing borrowers' activities with non-borrower activities. 
This ignores that farmers go through a selection process when 
they receive loans. Borrowers are not a random sample of all 
farmers. Those who receive loans may do better than farmers who 
do not borrow, not because of the loan, but because they were 
better farmers to start with. 
Overall, I feel that much less farm level impact research is 
needed and that more research effort ought to be directed to 
testing assumptions and policies that are closely associated with 
rural financial markets. Further, I feel that more research is 
needed on the determinants of RFM performance. This type of 
research would shed more light on why things do not work well in 
these markets and also provide useful insights on remedies. 
Donor Assistance 
Most people look at donor assistance as an important part of 
RFM problem solution. In a number of low income countries donor 
loans and grants have made up a large part of the total agri-
cultural loan portfolio. An agricultural credit project is 
highly desirable for both the donor and the local government. 
From the donor's side, credit projects are easy ways of moving 
quickly large amounts of money. With few exceptions, money lent 
for agricultural credit can be disbursed rapidly, generally 
' 
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requires little technical assistance, and is straight forward and 
simple. For the local government, these projects are also easy 
to arrange and allow the country access to large amounts of 
foreign exchange with few strings attached. Both the donor and 
the government go through a joint, self-delusion exercise when 
they consumate a loan for agricultural credit. They both ignore 
that the country does not need foreign exchange to expand the 
amount of local currency used for agricultural loans. Printing 
presses in the central bank do a dandy job of this. The external 
loan has three primary impacts. First, it provides the govern-
ment with more foreign exchange. Second, it orients RFMs toward 
external sources for their funding. And third, the loan can 
reinforce important policies that have a very substantial impact 
• 
on the overall performance of RFMs (e.g. Gonzalez-Vega, 1982) • 
External funds reinforce the dependency mentioned earlier, 
make it easier to sustain low interest rate policies, and 
discourage intermediaries from mobilizing savings. Concessionary 
rediscount facilities set up to move donor funds from the central 
banks to rural intermediaries are particularly damaging. I 
vividly remember asking the manager of an agricultural develpment 
bank in a low income country why he did not offer savings deposit 
services in any of his branches. During the previous several 
years urban financial intermediaries in his country had been very 
successful in mobilizing large amounts of voluntary savings from 
relatively low income households. His reply was that he saw no 
' • 
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need to bother with troublesome savings accounts, on which he 
would have to pay savers 6 percent interest, when he could get 
virtually all of the money he wanted out of donor funds available 
through the central bank for less than 4 percent! Dozens of 
managers of formal agricultural credit agencies in low income 
countries come to the same conclusion. All of the potential 
savings in rural areas that do not take place because many people 
receive low returns to savings, or in fact lack any acceptable 
places to hold additional savings, are major cost of these con-
cessionary rediscount facilities. 
Treatments 
In large measure, problems in RFMs are pressing because the 
strengths and weaknesses of financial markets are obscured by 
extensive sub-intellectual underbrush. Until recently, 
researchers have done a poor job of clearing away the misconcep-
tions and erroneous assumptions that clouded what goes on in 
RFMs. I know of no other area in development where there is a 
wider gap between policy makers perceptions and actual events, 
than is the case in RFMs. 
What can and should a rural financial market contribute to a 
country's development? I feel that its role is limited, rather 
straight forward, but nonetheless very important. A well func-
tioning financial market should provide loans to most of those 
who have economic opportunities that exceed the capacity of their 
own resources. A well functioning formal RFM is doing well if it 
• 
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services 20-25 percent of the farmers in a country. If roughly 
half of the farmers in the country have regular access to either 
formal or informal loans I feel the financial markets is doing a 
remarkably good job. 
Providing loans to farmers is less than half of the finan-
cial intermediation picture, however. A much larger number of 
rural people can benefit from convenient, safe, and high return 
savings deposit facilities. A properly functioning RFM should 
provide deposit facilities to more than three-quarters of the 
rural population. At present, most people in rural areas do not 
have access to these deposit facilities, and only a few receive 
the large majority of the cheap credit. Changes in the use of 
RFMs in development must stress a more balanced and equitable use 
of these markets • 
Policy makers must realize that it is impossible to use RFMs 
as a way of making income distributions more equal. Under the 
best of circumstances, the operations of financial markets will 
have a slightly negative effect on income distribution. (This 
would be a large improvement over what is currently happening, 
however.) Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
cheap credit is a very ineffective instrument to compensate far-
mers for low product prices and yields. Cheap credit fails on 
both equity an efficiency grounds. Further, cheap credit poli-
cies distort and undermine financial intermediaries activities, 
make these institutions much more susceptible to political mani-
pulation, and substantially diminish their capabilities. 
• 
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Despite the confusion that surrounds RFMs, the treatments 
for its problems are relatively simple. First and foremost, much 
more emphasis must be placed on encouraging these markets to 
vastly expand their savings mobilization efforts. Doing so would 
provide this valuable service to a large number of the rural poor 
who currently have few attractive savings opportunities. It 
would also reorient managers of financial intermediaries away 
from stroking government and donor officials to assure more 
loanable funds, to doing a better job of serving rural clients. 
This, in turn, would reduce the patronal relationships that 
currently dominate most RFMs. This would cause financial inter-
mediaries to be less susceptible to political intrusions, and 
also encoura~e local social sanctions on those who default on 
loans. In most countries it is socially acceptable to steal 
money from the government, but not acceptable to do so from 
neighbors. 
It will also be necessary to sharply revise interest rate 
policy. Savers will not hold substantial amounts of financial 
assets if the expected real rates of return are negative. 
Nominal rates of interest that are generally higher than expected 
rates of inflation are vital for aggressive savings mobilization 
efforts. Higher and more flexible rates on savings require 
higher and more flexible rates on loans. These higher rates 
would reduce the demand for loans among those who currently use 
large amounts of cheap credit, allow more lenders to cover their 
costs without subsidy and also encourage lenders to reduce the 
' c 
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costs of transacting loans for both borrowers and themselves. 
This would result in less non-price rationing of credit and also 
reduce the transaction costs of some to get access to loans. 
Higher interest rates would also allow intermediaries to service 
a broader range of businesses in rural areas than just farmers. 
With higher interest rates, lenders would also be willing to 
lengthen the term structure of their loans. 
Policy makers should not try to accomplish too much with 
financial markets. Product prices, crop yields and the costs of 
production are much more powerful determinants of farmers deci-
sions than are credit availability or interest rates. Some of 
the money and energy that is currently largely wasted in pushing 
cheap credit programs would be better directed at making product 
prices more attractive and in developing new technology that 
boosted yields and lowered costs of production. 
.. 
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